How Detailed of an Explanation is Required When an Administrative Agency Changes an Existing Policy? Implications and Analysis of FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. on Administrative Law Making and Television Broadcasters by Lee, David
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law
Judiciary
Volume 30 | Issue 2 Article 5
10-15-2010
How Detailed of an Explanation is Required When
an Administrative Agency Changes an Existing
Policy? Implications and Analysis of FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc. on Administrative Law
Making and Television Broadcasters
David Lee
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Communications Law Commons, and the
Entertainment and Sports Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
David Lee, How Detailed of an Explanation is Required When an Administrative Agency Changes an Existing Policy? Implications and
Analysis of FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. on Administrative Law Making and Television Broadcasters, 30 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L.
Judiciary Iss. 2 (2010)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol30/iss2/5
How Detailed of an Explanation is Required When an
Administrative Agency Changes an Existing Policy?
Implications and Analysis of FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc. on Administrative Law Making and
Television Broadcasters
By David Lee
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a scenario where you are sitting at home watching a
local high school football game on public access television. During
the middle of the closely contested game a ref rules that a player was
in fact out of bounds when he caught the ball. In frustration, an
enraged parent of one of the players sitting close to the broadcaster's
microphone yells that, "the ref can't see a fucking thing." This
profanity, yelled during a live, unpredictable sporting event, could
subject the public access station to crippling fines by the Federal
Communication Commission ("FCC") in the hundreds of thousands
of dollars, which could put the station out of business.
The FCC has the power to regulate what it deems indecent
material broadcast on either television or radio. For twenty-five
years the FCC policy allowed one expletive to be broadcast if the
word was neither repeated nor uttered intentionally; however, in
Golden Globes the FCC changed its regulatory policy by giving itself
the discretion to fine broadcasters if an expletive was said only once,
even accidentally.' The purpose of this article is twofold. The first is
* David Lee is finishing up the last semester of his third year at Pepperdine
School of Law. David received a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from Pitzer
College. I would like to thank my family; Michael, Mom, and Dad for all their
support and love throughout law school. My article wouldn't have happened
without the help and tireless work of the awesome NAALJ staff and its editors,
Shant and Danny.
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to explore the factors that the FCC examines in deciding whether
material broadcast on the airwaves is indecent and the type of
expletive utterances that may now subject broadcasters to indecency
fines. The second is to examine how detailed and thorough an
explanation a federal agency must give when announcing a change in
regulatory policy when the new regulations depart from a standard
that the agency had previously created. This article will achieve both
those ends by briefly tracing the history of the FCC's regulatory
policy. The majority of this article will be spent discussing and
analyzing the Supreme Court's plurality decision in FCC v. Fox
Television Services, Inc. in which the Court both upheld the FCC's
new regulatory policy and articulated the analysis an agency must
undertake in creating new regulations that deviate from the old.2
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A.FCC v. Pacifica
The holding in FCC v. Pacifica established the test that the FCC
used in determining whether material broadcast on the airwaves was
indecent, which had been in place over twenty-five years.3 Indecent
content only exists in the broadcast setting and cannot be found in,
"print, cable, satellite or the internet."4 The Pacifica Foundation
owned a radio station that aired a twelve minute comedic monologue
entitled, "Filthy Words" by George Carlin at roughly two in the
I See generally In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licenses
Regarding Their Airing of the "Golden Globes Awards" Program, 19 F.C.C.R.
4975, 4986 (2004).
2 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
1 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 729 (1978). Justice Stevens
wrote for the majority with Chief Justice Burger, Rehnquist joining, and Blackmun
and Powell joining in part. Id. at 727.
4 Mark Conrad, "Fleeting Expletives" and Sports Broadcasts: A Legal
Nightmare Needs a Safe Harbor, 18 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORTS 175, 177 (2008).
The 1934 Communication Act required all television and radio broadcasters to
obtain licenses from the government to broadcast on the electromagnetic spectrum.
Id. The Communication Act served as the legislative underpinning that allowed the
Federal Government to regulate material broadcast over the airwaves. Id.
afternoon.' The FCC derived its power to regulate indecent material
on the airwaves from 18 U.S.C. § 1464.6 The FCC described
indecent material in Pacifica as any material that at the time of
broadcast would be "patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory
activities and organs, at times of the day where there is a reasonable
risk that children may be in the audience."' The context in which a
word was spoken was crucial to the analysis of deciding whether the
word was indecent.8 Justice Stevens wrote that he wanted to
emphasize the narrowness of the holding in this case by explicitly
stating that the Court had not held "an occasional expletive ... would
justify any sanction." 9 Justice Stevens said rather colorfully that,
when "a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory
power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene."o Again,
the Court reiterated the holding that the FCC must consider the
context in which an expletive was spoken, whether the expletive was
used intentionally, and finally the repetitive nature of the phrase in
s See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729. In George Carlin's monologue entitled "Filthy
Words," he began the comedic routing by telling a live studio audience that he was
about to tell them about, "the words you couldn't say on public, ah, airwaves, um,
the ones you definitely wouldn't say ever." Id. George Carlin repeatedly said
throughout his routine seven expletives which were, "shit, piss, fuck, cunt,
cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits." George Carlin, Filthy Words,
http://www.cba.uni.edu/decencyl/7words.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2010). George
Carlin continued his comedic monologue by emphasizing why he thought these
words were particularly offensive and repeated the words over and over again. See
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729. The FCC received a letter of complaint about the
broadcast from a man who was driving with his young son while the monologue
was broadcast on the radio. See id at 730.
6 See id. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006) states, "Whoever utters any obscene,
indecent, profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined. .."
The FCC interpreted § 1464 in conjunction with 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) as giving them
the ability to treat broadcast speech differently from other types of speech and to
regulate indecent speech spoken on the airwaves. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731.
I Id. at 732 (quoting In re A Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Found.
Station Wbai (Fm), New York, N.Y. Declaratory Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98
(1975)).
8 Id. at 750.
9 Id.
10Id. at 750-51.
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determining whether the broadcaster should be subject to monetary
penalties." The policy of not fining broadcasters for one
unintentional obscene word that was uttered became known as the
"fleeting expletive" policy, which the FCC abruptly announced an
end of within the Golden Globes order.
B. In re Golden Globes
For twenty-five years the FCC followed the fleeting expletive
policy set out in Pacifica, but in 2004 the FCC reinterpreted Pacifica
by removing an essential step of the analysis. 12 Contrary to
Pacifica's holding, the context which an expletive was spoken was
no longer determinative in itself as to whether a broadcaster would be
fined when an indecent word or phrase was spoken on public
airwaves.13 Furthermore, this departed from the practice of the
FCC's restrained enforcement policy. 14 The FCC departed from the
previous interpretation of Pacifica and prohibited the broadcast of
any indecent word or phrase during prime time hours; if an indecent
word was spoken on the airwaves the FCC could now levy large fines
against the broadcaster.'s During the 2003 broadcast of the Golden
" See id. at 751.
12 In re Complaints Against various Broadcast Licenses Regarding Their
Airing of the "Golden Globes Awards" Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4986 (2004).
" See id.
14 See Robert Corn-Revere, Speech and Elections: FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc.: Awaiting the Next Act, CATO SUP. CT. REv. 2008-09, at 295, 302.
The FCC had previously given, "substantial deference to the 'editorial discretion of
licensees."' Id. The FCC previously refrained from fining broadcasters for
obscenities that were aired on the airwaves unless they involved the repeated
intentional use of profanities. Id. The FCC would only fine broadcasters if the
broadcast was as profanity riddled, or close to, George Carlins's "Filthy Words"
monologue. Id. at 307. In the aftermath of Pacifica, broadcasters were worried that
the Pacifica decision would cause them to curtail their programming. See Faith
Sparr, From Carlin's Seven Dirty Words to Bono's One Dirty Word: A Look at the
FCC's Ever-Expanding Indecency Enforcement Role, 3 FIRST AMEND. L. REv.
207, 221 (2005). FCC Chairman Charles D. Ferris told broadcasters that, "the FCC
was 'far more dedicated to the First Amendment premise that broadcasters should
air controversial programming [than were] worried about an occasional four-letter
word." Id.
" See Golden Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4986. This analysis overturned the prior
fleeting expletive policy. The FCC stated that, "while prior Commission and staff
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Globes, Bono, lead singer of the band U2, said in accepting the
award for Best Original Song, "this is really, really, fucking brilliant.
Really, really great."' 6 The FCC received hundreds of complaints
from viewers who saw Bono use the F-word on live television.'7
The Commission used a three factor test to determine whether
material broadcast was indecent. In making the indecency
determination, the Commission was to look at the following three
factors and the context which the material was broadcast:
(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or
description of sexual or excretory organs or activities; (2) whether the
material dwells on or repeats at length description of sexual or
excretory organs or activities; (3) whether the material appears to
pander or is used to titillate, or whether the material appears to have
been presented for its shock value.19
In the FCC's new analysis the Commission required two
preliminary findings that must be made before material broadcast
could be found to be indecent: 1) "the material must describe or
depict sexual or excretory organs or activities," and 2) "the broadcast
must be patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium." 20 The Commission found the
first prong of the indecency test satisfied because the F-Word used in
any context, variation, or manner is inherently indecent because of
the F-Word's implicit sexual connotation; meaning Bono's utterance
of the F-Word fell squarely within the first factor established by
action have indicated that isolated or fleeting broadcasts of the "F-Word" . . . are
not indecent or would not be acted upon, consistent with our decision today we
conclude that any such interpretation is no longer good law." Id. at 4980. Prior to
Golden Globes, a single profane utterance was often found not to be indecent; a
news announcer's statement, "Ooops, fucked that one up" found not to be indecent;
Cher saying, "fuck 'em" on the Billboard Awards Show found not to be indecent.
See id. at 4980 n.32.
16 Id. at 4976.
17 Id.
' See id. at 4977.
19 Id. at 4978.20 Id. at 4977. This would also mean that any use of the F-Word on television
or radio would satisfy the first prong of the test.
Fall 2010 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 685
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Pacifica.2 1 The Commission found the F-Word to be one of the most
shocking, graphic, vulgar words in the English language and
therefore any use of the F-Word is patently offensive to
contemporary community standards, thus satisfying the second prong
of the test.22 By finding that the F-Word is patently offensive,
regardless of its context, the FCC departed from its previous
interpretation of Pacifica.23
The Commission also relied upon advances in technology that
allow broadcasters to add a delay to live broadcasts as one of the
reasons for the new regulatory policy. 24 Prior to this decision, the
Commission focused on what is profane in the context of
blasphemous speech.25 The Commission gave a blatant warning to
broadcasters by saying that the Commission will now, "consider
under the definition of 'profanity' the 'F-Word' and those words (or
variants thereof) that are as highly offensive . . . to the extent
language is broadcast between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m." 26 The
Commission jumped upon a perceived opening in Pacifica; the FCC
said that the Court left open the issue of whether a single expletive
21 See Golden Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4977. Even though the Commission
agreed that the F-Word can be used an as a synonym for really or very they still
thought that the use of the F-Word, even as an "intensifier," conjures up images of
sexual activities. See id. This means that the F-Word used in any context
whatsoever is indecent without any special attention paid to the context that the F-
Word was said.
22 See id. at 4979. The Commission found that even though the use of the F-
Word in this instance was unintentional, the use of the F-word was still shocking.
Id. The mere fact the word is uttered is enough. Id.
23 See id. at 4978. When the Commission said that its new interpretation of
Pacifica was not inconsistent with the Pacifica opinion, they were relying on the
concurrence rather than the majority. See Sparr, supra note 15, at 244. This part of
the concurrence of Pacifica was intended to limit the enforcement powers of the
FCC rather than broaden them. See Golden Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. 4979.
24 See id. at 4980. The advancement in so called "bleeping technology" allows
broadcasters to avoid indecency violations by adding a delay to a live broadcast
which is sufficiently long enough that the broadcaster would be able to catch and
bleep any indecent word even if the utterance was spoken only once. See id.
25 See id at 4981.
26 See id. The Commission jumped upon a perceived opening in Pacifica
when they said that the Court left open the issue of whether a single expletive could
be considered indecent. See id.
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could be considered indecent.27 This is a blatant change in policy
from allowing a single fleeting explicative during prime time hours to
banning all indecent phrases during primetime hours. In determining
the profane or innocent nature of a phrase, the FCC dramatically
decreased the emphasis to be placed upon the context which a word
was spoken in the analysis that is to be performed when considering
whether or not to fine a broadcaster. The Commission's decision in
Golden Globes forced the Supreme Court to address the question of
how precisely a federal agency explicate the reasons for abrupt
deviations from earlier policies that come without any guidance from
Congress or the Executive Branches of government.
C. In re Various Television Broadcasts
The FCC exercised the expanded regulatory power that they gave
themselves in the Golden Globes decision for the first time in re
Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts.28 This FCC
administrative order is the case that eventually made its way in the
Supreme Court in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. In this
opinion the FCC held that various television broadcasters had
broadcast profane, indecent material during hours where children
were likely to be watching television.2 9 The FCC looked at
complaints leveled against thirty-two different broadcasts that aired
from February 2, 2002, to March 8, 2005.30 The FCC found that
twenty-eight of the broadcasts did not violate the indecency standard,
but four broadcasts were found to be indecent.31 One of the
complaints stemmed from the 2002 broadcast of the Billboard Music
Awards, which aired at eight in the evening on December ninth.32
While accepting an award Cher yelled, "people have been telling me
I'm on my way out every year, right? So fuck'em."33 Another
broadcast eventually found to be indecent stemmed from The 2003
27 See generally Golden Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 (2004).
28 See In re Matter of Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts
Between February 2, 2002 & March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299 (2006)
29 See id.
30 Id.
31 See id. at 13300.
32 d
33 1d.
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 687Fall 2010
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Billboard Music Awards which was broadcast on December 10,
2003.34 During this broadcast, Nicole Richie, who was presenting an
award, said, "have you ever tried to get cow shit out of a Prada
purse? It's not so fucking simple." 5 Both of these statements were
made in similar contextual settings in that, both were made during
live national award shows, adlibbed without any advance warning to
broadcasters, and repeated only once in the respective broadcasts.
1.The 2003 Billboard Music Awards
The television broadcaster Fox argued that even though Ms.
Richie used the F-Word, the broadcast could not found to be
actionably indecent.36 Fox said that in this context the F-Word did
not describe or depict sexual activities, but was a vulgar word used
to, "express emphasis."37 The FCC disagreed.38 The FCC laid out its
indecency analysis before explicating why Ms. Richie's comment
was considered indecent.39 The FCC relied upon its reinterpretation
34 See In re Matter of Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts
Between February 2, 2002 & March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13300 (2006).
3 5 d. At the time the award show aired, Nicole Richie and Paris Hilton starred
in a television show called, The Simple Life. In The Simple Life, these two socialites
were taken from the city to live in the rural countryside which was a dramatic
departure from the luxurious lifestyles that these two young women had previously
enjoyed. The other complaint stemmed from the repeated use of the word,
"bullshit" on several NYPD Blue episodes that were broadcast on various dates in
2003. See id. The final complaint that the commission found to be indecent
stemmed from a broadcast of The Early Show at eight thirty in the morning on
December thirteenth; a guest on the show, Twila Tanner, was a contestant on CBS
Survivor Vanuat and she referred to another contestant on that show as a,
"bullshitter." See id. at 13301.
36 1d. at 13303.
371d.
" See id.
3 See id. The FCC defined indecent speech as material that, "in context,
depicts or describes sexual or excretory activities or organs in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium." Id. The FCC must first find the material falls into the FCC indecency
definition by describing sexual or excretory activities, then the FCC must also find
that the material is patently offensive by current community standards. See id at
13304-05. In determining whether the material is patently offensive the FCC
looked at the context in which the words were spoken and three principal factors:
"(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description; (2) whether the material
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of Pacifica rather than the twenty-five years of jurisprudence that the
FCC abruptly departed from in Golden Globes. The FCC said that
any use of the F-Word has sexual connotation even if the word is
used as an intensifier rather than literally.40 By finding any use of the
F-Word now falls within the scope of the FCC indecency definition,
the FCC essentially ignored the element of the Pacifica indecency
analysis that required the FCC to look at the context in which a
potentially indecent word was spoken.4 1 Worryingly, the FCC also
dramatically expanded its regulatory power since it could fine
broadcast stations for a single, fleeting expletive.
Since the FCC found Ms. Richie's utterance fell within the
indecent definition, the FCC went onto the second prong of the
analysis, which was determining whether the F-Word was patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards.42 The
FCC found that the description of someone scraping cow excrement
out of a designer bag was designed to shock, titillate, and pander.4 3
Due to the large number of children expected to be in the audience,
and because the Billboard Awards is a popular awards show, the FCC
found the description of the cow excrement, coupled with the use of
the F-Word, "shocking and vulgar" by contemporary community
standards.44
Although the FCC recognized that the Golden Globes order
changed the indecency analysis, it put forth three reasons why Ms.
Richie's comments would have still been held to be indecent using
pre-Golden Globes jurisprudence.45 The fact that the FCC took the
time to explicate why it still would have found both cases to be
indecent under the indecency policy established in Pacifica reveals
that the FCC was aware just how dramatic a departure the new
indecency policy was from the old Pacifica analysis. First, the "S-
Word" was used in an excretory sense, which was integral to a
dwells on or repeats at length the descriptions; and (3) whether the material panders
to, titillates or shocks the audience." Id at 13304.
40 See In re Matter of Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts
Between February 2, 2002 & March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13304 (2006).
41 See id.
42 See id.
43 See id. at 13305.
" See id.
45 See id.
Fall 2010 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 689
690 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
graphic description.4 6 Second, repetitive use was not required pre-
Golden Globes.47 Third, Ms. Richie's comments were deliberate
because the majority of the comments were planned in advance.48
The FCC further explained that this decision was indecent post-
Golden Globes because that decision did away with the requirement
that specific words or phrases had to be repeated to be found
indecent.4 9 The FCC argued that Ms. Richie's vulgar remarks could
have been avoided if they had been read off of a script rather than
adlibbed on live television.50
2.2002 Billboard Music Awards
The FCC once again found that Cher's use of the F-Word
satisfies the first prong of the indecency test because the nonliteral
use of the F-Word still invoked implicit images of sexual conduct."
The FCC repeated much of its analysis regarding the graphic nature
of the F-Word, which it used when describing Ms. Richie's
comments. 52 The FCC described in detail the large number of
children who were watching the 2002 Billboard Music Awards and
46 See In re Matter of Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts
Between February 2, 2002 & March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13305 (2006).
47 Id.
48 See id.
49 See id.
o Id. at 13312. The FCC added that Fox shown have known that Ms. Richie
would say something profane during the awards show. See id. During the running
of The Simple Life, in which Ms. Richie starred, Fox bleeped the F-Word nine
times, yet they still chose her to be a broadcaster. The FCC implied that it was
obvious and likely that she would in fact use the F-word on live television. See
generally id. The FCC found that the five second delay that Fox was using to
censor the event was neither adequate nor reasonable as they used the same system
during the 2002 Billboard Music Awards which did not prevent the profanity that
Cher uttered from making it onto the air. Id. at 13313.
" See id. at 13323. The FCC linked Cher's hostile use of the F-Word to refer
to her critics as reference to the sexual act. See id.
52 See In re Matter of Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts
Between February 2, 2002 & March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13323 (2006).
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used this fact as a critical part of its reasoning in holding the
broadcast was actionably indecent.5 3
D. Procedural History
1.Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2nd Cir. 2007)
Fox Television Station and various broadcasters petitioned the
Second Circuit to appeal the new indecency regime the FCC laid out
in its 2004 Golden Globes order.5 4 The appellate court began its
analysis by tracing the history of when the FCC began to regulate
indecent speech on the airwaves. The appellate court went onto
discuss how the FCC had regulated indecent speech in the immediate
aftermath of the Pacifica holding.56 The FCC did not find another
broadcast indecent for ten years after the Pacifica decision. The
appeals court then listed the factors that the FCC used to determine
1 See id. The FCC stated Nielsen statistics, which revealed that 2,608,000
people under the age of 18 were watching the award show and 1,186,000 were
between the ages of two and eleven. Id.
Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d 452 (2nd Cir. 2007).
s The appellate court found that the FCC's regulatory power governing
indecent speech was derived from 18 U.S.C. § 1464. See id. at 447. The appellate
court then discussed the holding of Pacifica, which was the first time that the FCC
actively regulated indecent material that was broadcast on the airwaves. See id.
The Second Circuit saw the holding of Pacifica as incredibly narrow. See id. at
448. The appellate court found that Pacifica only applied to the question of
whether Carlin's monologue was indecent rather than the general question of what
can be categorized as indecent speech. See id. The appeals court read Pacifica as
allowing for the FCC to regulate indecent speech on the airwaves without running
afoul of the First Amendment. See id.
56 The appellate court listed various cases where the FCC refused to define
and categorize speech as indecent on the airwaves. See id. at 449. The FCC
declined to hold speech indecent in three separate occasions when during the
morning hours a broadcaster aired programs containing language such as
"motherfucker," "fuck," and "shit." Id.
57 See id. The appellate court cited In re Infinity Broad. Corp. of
Pennsylvania, 3 F.C.C. 930 (1987) which stated:
Unstated, but widely assumed, and implemented for the most part through staff
rulings, was the belief that only material that closely resembled the George Carlin
monologue would satisfy the indecency test articulated by the FCC in 1975. Thus,
no action was taken unless material involved the repeated use, for shock value, of
words similar or identical satirized in the Carlin 'Filthy Words' monologue. See id.
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 691Fall 2010
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whether speech was indecent in a 2001 settlement agreement." The
Second Circuit then turned its attention to the Golden Globes
decision, which, as already mentioned, had abruptly eliminated the
policy of permitting broadcasters a single, fleeting expletive without
imposing large monetary sanctions on the broadcasters.5 9
2.Discussion
The appellate court began its analysis by setting forth the statute
giving it the authority to set aside agency decisions.6 0 The statute
requires agencies to articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
change in policy, which must be rooted in facts rather than politics.61
An agency must follow the reasoning and deliberation process that
Congress intended the agency would follow when changing existing
policy.62 The Second Circuit agreed with the networks that the FCC
made a "180-degree turn" regarding its indecency policy because the
FCC did not supply an adequate explanation of why it was changing
policy.63
The FCC argued that nonliteral uses of profane words fell within
its indecency definition because it would be impossible to
"distinguish whether a word was being used as an expletive or as a
ss See id. at 451. The FCC then explained that an indecency finding involves
the following two determinations: (1) whether the material falls within the "subject
matter scope of [the] indecency definition - that is, the material must describe or
depict sexual or excretory organs or activities; and (2) whether the broadcast is
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium." See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
5 See id. Since the FCC found the "F-Word" to be the most profane and
indecent in the English language, uttering it once would be enough to warrant
indecency fines. See id.
1o See Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 454. The court has the power to overturn
agency decisions that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise
not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
61 See Fox, 489 F.3d at 455.
62 See id.
6 1 Id. When an agency decides to create a new policy, it must give the reasons
for the change, show that the rule is consistent within the scope of their regulatory
powers, address alternative policies, and finally, give reasons for the rejection of
those alternatives. See id. at 456 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S.
837, 863 (1984)).
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literal description of sexual or excretory functions."' The Second
Circuit said that this reasoning defied both common sense and
logic. 6 5 The appellate court also took issue with the Commission's
rationale that if the Commission allowed broadcasters an exemption
for a single fleeting expletive then the broadcasters would air profane
words at all hours of the day if the old policy allowing fleeting
expletives was still in place. 66 The fleeting expletive exemption had
been the FCC's indecency policy for twenty-five years, yet
broadcasters had never flooded the airwaves with profanity during
that time. 67 There is no reason why the broadcasters would begin
increasing the amount of expletives spoken on their shows in the
upcoming months and years.
The appellate court declined to address the constitutional
challenges raised by the networks in their briefs but raised some
constitutional questions regarding the tensions that exist between the
First Amendment and the FCC's indecency policy. 68 The court then
vacated and remanded the case so that the Commission could set
forth the detailed analysis required by the appellate court.
3.Dissent
The dissent, written by Judge Leval, argued that the FCC gave a
well thought out explanation for its change of policy regarding
expletives.69 The dissent did not find the agency's reasoning
particularly compelling, but Judge Leval found the change modest
and within its regulatory authority.70 He found that the Commission
complied with the requirements required of it in explicating its
decision." The dissent had no issue with the fact that the new policy
6 Id. at 459.
65 See id. Bono's speech during the Golden Globes where he pronounced that
winning the award was, "really, really fucking brilliant" is a perfect example of an
indecent word being used in a non-literal way with no sexual connotation. See id
66 See id. at 460.
67 See Fox, 489 F.3d at 460.
68 See id. at 462.
69 See id. at 467. (Leval, J., dissenting).
70 See id. at 469.
71 See id. at 470.
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 693FaH 2010
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of the Commission was inconsistent with its old.72 The dissent levied
the serious allegation that the majority was disingenuous in its
opinion because Judge Leval felt the majority simply disagreed with
the new policy the FCC had set out rather than believing that the
FCC's new expletive policy ran afoul of the requirements imposed by
the law.
III. ANALYSIS OF OPINION
A. FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009)
This plurality opinion was delivered by Justice Scalia.74 Justice
Scalia began the opinion by reciting the holding of FCC v. Pacifica.75
Justice Scalia then traced the history of where the FCC had received
its congressional mandate to regulate obscene material, which was
found in 18 U.S.C. § 1464.76 Justice Scalia then explained the
Commission's evolving definition of what materials fit within the
scope of the indecency definition.7 7 He saw that the Commission
expanded its indecency regulation beyond the repeated use of
indecent words, while still preserving a distinction between "literal
and non-literal (or 'expletive') uses of evocative language."78 Justice
Scalia still believed that the context in which expletives were used
72 See id. at 471. For the dissent the only issue was whether or not the
Commission had the authority to change its policy as it had. See id.
7 See Fox, 489 F.3d at 474 (Leval, J., dissenting). The court is supposed to
give deference to agency's decisions, even when those decisions are not the same
one that the court would have reached.
74 FCC, 129 S. Ct. at 1800. Justices Kennedy, Roberts, Thomas, and Alito
joined Parts I, II, III-A through III-D and IV.
7 See id. at 1806. The holding of Pacifica was in part that federal law
prohibits the broadcasting of indecent language, which includes references to
sexual activity or organs. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. 1464.
76 See FCC, 129 S. Ct. at 1806. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 bars any indecent language
through the broadcast medium between the hours of 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. See also 18
U.S.C. § 1464. Justice Scalia then recited the holding of Pacifica, where the Court
held that the First Amendment allowed for indecent material to be regulated
because of the material's accessibility to children. See id.
7 7 See FCC, 129 S. Ct. at 1806.
71 See id. at 1807.
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was still a crucial factor in deciding whether or not the profane
utterance warranted the Commission to take some sort of action.7 9
Justice Scalia acknowledged that, in 2004, the Commission
expanded the scope of the indecency regulatory definition by
declaring non-literal use of the F- and S-words could be indecent,
subjecting the broadcasters to action taken against them.o Justice
Scalia then recited Bono's use of the F-word during his 2004 Golden
Globes performance. The Justice then briefly repeated the
Commission's holding from the case in which the Commission
expanded the definition of indecency." Golden Globe made it
absolutely clear that a single profane utterance, regardless of the
context, could be found actionably indecent.82
1.Plurality Analysis
Justice Scalia took issue with the Second Circuit's reading of the
holding in State Farm.83 He did not find that the Administrative
Procedure Act required a heightened standard of review when an
agency changed one of its former policies.84 Justice Scalia found no
distinction in 5 U.S.C. § 706 between initial agency action and later
actions reversing the former policy.8 5 However, there still existed the
requirement that an agency explain the change of policy with well
thought out reasons explaining why the new policy is a good policy. 86
Justice Scalia just found that the agency need not spend more time
79 See id.
so See id.
81 See id. Scalia also rehashed Nicole Richie's profane utterance during her
award show. See id.
82 See id. at 1809. The Commission disregarded its previous dichotomy of
implicit and explicit uses of the F-Word because they found that the F-Word is
such a vulgar word that it offends regardless of the contexts in which it is used. See
id.
83 See FCC, 129 S. Ct. at 1810.
84 See id. The Justice did not see the State Farm holding, "implicitly or
explicitly," that agencies' policy changes must be justified by more substantial
reasoning than when the policy was first announced. See id.
85 See id. at 1811. The statute gives the court the power to set aside agency
action found to be, "arbitrary, capricious." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
86 See FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1811.
Fall 2010 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 695
696 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 30-2
explicating the new change in policy than when the original policy
was articulated." It is enough for the agency to have regulatory
authority under a statute and reason why the new policy is better than
the old." An agency must only explain the change in regulatory
policy when its new policy "rests upon factual findings that
contradict those which underlay its prior policy; or when its prior
policy has engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken
into account."89 Scalia declined, just as the appellate court did, to
answer the First Amendment questions raised by the broadcasters in
their briefs.90
Scalia found the FCC's change in policy during Golden Globes to
be completely consistent with the standard imposed upon the agency
by 5 U.S.C. § 706.9' Scalia saw that the Commission's decision of
looking at isolated uses of profane utterances was consistent with the
Pacifica decision. 92
2.Addressing the Appellate Court's Reasoning
Justice Scalia raised and subsequently dismissed the three main
reasons that the court of appeals used to find the Commission's
change in policy arbitrary and capricious.9 3 First, the court of
appeals did not think the Commission had adequately explained the
change in policy.94 As Scalia previously explained, there was no
heightened requirement imposed by law for when a federal agency
8 See id.
8 See id.
* See id.
90 See id.
91 See id. at 1812. The agency knew that it was changing its former policy and
took the appropriate steps to explicate its new policy; that is why the agency did
not impose fines upon broadcasters who initially violated the new, strict, fleeting
expletive policy. See id.
92 See FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1811. Advances in censoring
technology has made it easier for the broadcasters to bleep out single offensive
words which lends support to the Commission's increased enforcement policy. See
id.
9 See id. at 1813.
9 See id.
changes its former policy.95 Second, the appellate court thought that
the Commission's new policy would require it to ban all indecent
expletives, throwing out the context based approach. 96 Scalia
disagreed with this analysis; he saw that the Commission could still
consider on a case-by-case basis if an expletive was considered
profane or indecent.97 Third, the court of appeals was not convinced
that a per se exemption for a single profane utterance would cause
increased use of expletives across all broadcast networks.98 Justice
Scalia found that continuing to allow for complete immunity for
fleeting indecent phrases could in fact lead to an increased use of
expletives, which he saw to be "an exercise in logic rather than
clairvoyance." 9 9
3.Justice Scalia's Treatment of the Dissents
Justice Scalia began his treatment of the dissents with Justice
Breyer's dissent."oo Justice Scalia disagreed with Justice Breyer's
characterization of the degree of oversight courts must exercise over
agencies.'01 Justice Scalia noted that independent agencies are no
longer subservient to the President, as Justice Breyer insisted, but
instead independent agencies follow the guidance of Congress in
formulating new policies.102 Justice Scalia pointed to evidence that
95 Id.
96 See id. at 1814.
9 See id. The broadcasters used the fact that the Commission had found a
broadcast of the film Saving Private Ryan as not indecent to show that the new
policy was arbitrary and capricious. See id. Scalia disagreed because the violent
nature of the movie would put parents on notice that profanity may be uttered and
the material was not suitable for young children. Id.
" See FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1814.
9 See id. Justice Scalia did not address the reasons why he thought it was
logical to assume that there would be an increase in expletives on television while
there had not been for the twenty-five years that the former policy had been in
place.
0 Id. at 1815.
101 See id.
102 See id.
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the FCC changed policy after pressure from Congress rather than the
executive branch.103
Justice Scalia then went on to address the dissent of Justice
Stevens." Justice Stevens recognized that Congress, rather than the
Executive, had political control over independent agencies, but he
still thought that agencies must explain why their former policies are
no longer sound before they change course."os Justice Scalia
believed that Justice Stevens's arguments were illogical.106 Justice
Stevens wanted the Commission to explain why the FCC departed
from the line that Pacifica drew regarding whether banning fleeting
expletives would violate the First Amendment.'07 Scalia took issue
with this reasoning because the Court drew no constitutional line in
Pacifica and the Court expressly declined to address the
constitutional issues regarding banning fleeting expletives in the
Pacifica decision. 08
Justice Scalia disagreed with Justice Breyer's analysis of the
financial burdens that would be placed on small broadcasters by the
new regulations.' 09 Justice Breyer said that small broadcasters might
not be able to afford the technology that bleeps out indecent words
during live broadcasts." 0 These small broadcasters would be subject
to monetary sanctions that could put them out of business."' Justice
Scalia doubted the reality of this situation because he believed the
FCC would not penalize every single broadcaster uniformly for each
103 See id. Justice Scalia pointed to the hearing that the House's Oversight
Committee held on the FCC's broadcast indecency enforcement on January 28,
2004. See note 4 at 1816. During the hearing, members of the Subcommittee felt
that broadcasters were engaged in a "race to the bottom, pushing the decency
envelope to distinguish themselves in the increasingly crowded entertainment
field." Id. There was another hearing two weeks later where the Subcommittee
held hearings on a bill that would increase fines for indecency violations. See id.
10 FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1816.
1os Id.
"o6 See id. If the Commission was an agent of Congress, then their change of
policy would be at the direction of Congress and require no increased explanation
since the agency was merely carrying out the wishes of Congress. Id.
107 See id at 1817.
'os See id. at 1817-18.
'
09 See id. at 1818.
0 FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1818.
" Id.
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fleeting expletive spoken on television or radio.1 2 Despite the
broadcasters asking the Court to do so, the majority declined to
address First Amendment issues, as the lower courts had not taken
them up." 3
The plurality concludes the opinion by dismissing the Second
Circuit's claim that even though children are more likely to hear
indecent language today than they were in the 1970's, there should
not be any more stringent regulation governing indecent speech on
broadcast networks." 4 The majority finally concluded by finding the
Commission's orders neither arbitrary nor capricious, by reversing
the judgment of the Second Circuit, and by remanding the case for
further proceedings consistent with the opinion."15
4.Justice Thomas's Concurrence
Justice Thomas agreed with the Court's opinion upholding the
FCC's change in regulatory policy, but questioned the reasoning the
majority used to reach their decision.'1 6 Justice Thomas argued that
Red Lion and Pacifica are incorrect opinions, which should no longer
be relied upon by the Court."'7 In Red Lion, the Court affirmed the
reasoning that broadcasters had limited First Amendment protection
112 See id. Scalia cited the original FCC remand order which stated regarding
the penalties assessed to small broadcasters that, "the Commission would consider
the facts of each individual case," meaning that the same penalty imposed on a
broadcaster such as Fox may not be imposed on a small town local Fox affiliate.
See id. This scenario was too hypothetical for Justice Scalia to even want to
consider, as he only would address the issue of small broadcasters if that issue were
to come up before the Court in a subsequent case. See id.
113 See id. The Supreme Court is a court of final review not first impression.
Id. at 1819.
114 See id.
115 See id.
116 See FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1819 (Thomas, J., concurring).
"' See id. at 1820. Justice Thomas's main issue with Red Lion and Pacifica
was with the cases treatment of the First Amendment. See id. Red Lion upheld the
"fairness doctrine" which was a requirement that when public issues were
presented on broadcast stations each side of the issue was to be given fair coverage.
See id. The Court in Pacifica then relied upon Red Lion to say that broadcasters
were to receive limited First Amendment rights. See id. Thomas did see the
decisions as an adequate explanation for why broadcasters' First Amendment rights
were eroded. See id. at 1822.
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because of the scarcity of frequencies on the airwaves."' The
creation of modem technology had eviscerated the argument
regarding the limited frequencies that the Court used in its earlier
decisions." 9 By declaring that broadcasters were subject to limited
First Amendment rights, the Court, in Thomas's view, was violating
the Constitution because "Red Lion adopted and, Pacifica reaffirmed,
a legal rule that lacks any textual basis in the Constitution."120
5.Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy agreed that the FCC's change in policy should
be upheld, but for different reasons than the majority.121 Justice
Kennedy agreed in part with Breyer's dissent that when an agency
decides to change an existing policy, the new policy can be arbitrary
and capricious if the agency does not provide a detailed explanation
for the change.122 However, not every change in agency policy
requires a more reasoned explanation than the original policy.123
When an agency changes a long-standing policy there could be
times when new discoveries in science, advances in technology, or
other modem societal changes create a substantial need for a new
policy.124 These advances may have created a significant amount of
empirical data for the agency to rely upon in changing their policy.125
The key question that dictates the thoroughness an agency must
declare in its explanation of policy is,
[W]hether the agency's reasons for the change, when viewed in
light of the data available to it, and when informed by the experience
and expertise of the agency, suffice to demonstrate that the new
policy rests upon principles that are rational, neutral, and in accord
with the agency's proper understanding of its authority. That showing
118 See id. at 1820.
119 See id. at 1822.
120 Id. at 1821.
121 See id. at 1822 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy joined Parts I,
II, III-A through III-D, and IV of the majority.
122 See FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1822.
123 See id.
124 See id. at 1823
125 See id.
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may be required if the agency is to demonstrate that its action is not,
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in
accordance with the law." 126
This view is persuasive. When an agency changes policy it
should have to explicate the policy to make it clear that the reasons
for the change were not political. When an agency changes an
existing policy, the change in policy should be rooted in the current
law, level of technology, scientific sophistication, and societal norms.
There are delicate constitutional issues to address when dealing with
agencies. The Federal Government could not function without
administrative agencies; but if agencies are permitted to do as they
please without explaining their actions adequately, they could run
afoul of constitutional principles of the separation powers and checks
and balances.127
6.Justice Ginsburg's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Ginsburg began her decision by announcing that she was
joining the dissent of Justice Breyer.128 She agreed that the FCC
policy switch was arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with the
holding of Pacifica.129 Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate dissent to
discuss the First Amendment issues raised by the new policy that the
FCC had undertaken with its new expletive policy.13 0 She found that
George Carlin's monologue was distinguishable from the facts at
issue in the current case.131
George Carlin's monologue involved the scripted repeated use of
expletives while during the award ceremonies at issue in this case the
126 See id.
127 See id.
12s See FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1828 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
'"
9See id
130 See id. Justice Ginsberg went onto describe Georg Carlin's "Filthy Words"
monologue and how it gave rise to the holding in Pacifica. Id. The Justices in
Pacifica stressed that Carlin intentionally repeated profane words throughout the
monologue with the purpose to shock the audience listening to the monologue. See
id.
"3I See id. at 1828-29.
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expletives were "neither deliberate nor relentlessly repetitive."' 32
Pacifica was a narrowly written opinion which was only supposed to
cover repetitive deliberate expletives.' 33 Justice Ginsburg wanted the
Court to be careful that if the First Amendment issue ever reached the
Supreme Court that, "'in our land of cultural pluralism' . . . we
should be mindful that words unpalatable to some may be
'commonplace' for others."' 34
7.Justice Breyer's Dissenting Opinion
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg joined Justice Breyer's
dissent.13 5 Justice Breyer did not think that the FCC adequately
explained the decision to change the indecency policy from
permitting fleeting uses of expletives to a policy that made no
exception for single profane utterances. 136 Instead of focusing on
two critical factors, the FCC instead discussed several factors which
were already discussed in Pacifica; these factors by themselves were
inadequate to allow for a change in policy.' 37 Therefore, the FCC
decision was arbitrary and capricious, and should have been
overturned according to the dissent.138
Justice Breyer began by discussing the law that grants
independent administrative agencies the power to set their own
regulatory policy.139 The law required agencies to explain new
regulatory policies when a new policy departs from an old and the
law bars agencies from implementing new policy for purely political
reasons. 40 Agencies are not accountable to voters so that
independence allows them to create policy free from "political
132 See id. at 1828 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Brennan's dissent
in Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 775).
133 See FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1829.
134 See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Brennan's dissent in
Pacica, 438 U.S. at 775).
' FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1829 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
136 See id.
137 See id.
138 See id.
13 See id.
1401d.
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oversight."'41 However, that independence from voters makes it all
the more critical that courts review agencies' decision making
process to assure that they follow procedures that are in compliance
with the law.14 2
When agencies undertake a new policy through reasoned
argument and deliberation, the policy the agency has undertaken is
not arbitrary. 4 3 It is up to the courts to determine whether a change
of policy was based on relevant facts such as new scientific evidence
or advances in technology.'" Agencies must follow their own policy
and act consistently in enforcing their regulatory authority.14 5
Changing a policy requires more deliberation than explaining why a
new policy is good.'4 6 The agency must also answer the question of
"[w]hy did you change" your former regulatory policy.147 The
explanation to that question must be more thorough and detailed than
if the agency was announcing the change in the first place. 148 This is
the key distinction between the dissent and the majority. Justice
Scalia did not think that a heightened level of reasoning was required
when an agency changed an existing policy.
Justice Breyer then explained the level of reasoning he thought an
agency must undertake when changing a pre-existing administrative
141 FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1829 (quoting Freytag v. Comm's, 501
U.S. 868, 916 (1991)). "That insulation helps to secure important government
objectives, such as the constitutionally related objective of maintain broadcast
regulation that does not bend too readily before the political winds." See id. at
1829-30.
142 See id. at 1830. The Justice went onto say that the applicable law
governing agencies' decision making process is the Administrative Procedure Act,
supra. Courts exercise their discretionary power over agencies sparingly but have
not given them unlimited reign to create policy that is not in accordance with the
law. See id.
143 See id. The agencies have to follow a rational and logical decision making
process. Id. The Justice reasoned that when an agency articulates a new policy, the
policy "must reflect the reasoned exercise of expert judgment." See id.
'" See id.
145 See id. Justice Breyer again reiterates that when an agency changes its
former policy, the reasons for changing that policy must be adequately explained.
See id.
146 Id.
147 FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1830.
148 See id.
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policy through a hypothetical example.149 The hypothetical went as
such: if an agency created a policy that required driving on the right-
side of the road rather than the left-side, the agency might say,
"[w]ell, one side seemed as good as the other, so I flipped a coin."150
This explanation would be adequate for the initial choice of
formulating the policy; however, if the agency changed the law by
restricting drivers to the left side of the road twenty-five years later,
this initial explanation would not be adequate.' 5 ' Justice Breyer then
explained the requirements that State Farm imposed on an agency
decision that rescinded earlier policy.15 2 In State Farm, the
unanimous Court wrote that an agency must provide a more
thoroughly reasoned explanation for a policy than its initial reasoning
during the conception of a policy.' 53 The more detailed explanation
applies to both policy rescissions and modifications of earlier
policy.15 4
Justice Breyer disagreed with the majority's characterization of
his opinion as he would not require a heightened standard of review
for agency decisions.' 5 It is the law that requires agencies to focus
on how their policy has changed, not the Court.156 The Justice was
aware of the fact that sometimes the explanation that "we now weigh
relevant considerations differently" is enough as required by law, but
often it is not enough.15 1 When an agency can, it should say more.'
An agency explicates its new policy further than its initial
formulation of a policy when it reinterprets the same facts and laws,
or when new facts have presented themselves requiring the agency
14 9 See id. at 1831.
Iso See id.
151 See id.
152 See id.
I See FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1831 (citing State Farm, 463 U.S.
at 41).
154 Id. Justice Breyer listed a series of questions that the agency decision must
address: "[w]hy does it now reject the considerations that led it to adopt the initial
policy? What has changed in the world that offers justification for the change?
What other good reasons are there for departing from the earlier policy?" Id.
i55 See id.
156 See id.
1" Id.
158 See id.
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to change course.'59 Rather than require a better reason for an initial
policy decision, Justice Breyer would require agencies to explain
why they changed the policy.160
Justice Breyer was alarmed over how the majority's holding
could significantly change judicial review over agencies decisions,
and not in a "healthy direction."1 61 The issue is that if it is always
legally sufficient for the agency to merely state that it preferred the
new policy then there would be no point in asking the agency why it
had changed the policy in the first place.162 The Justice fears that this
is all that would be required under the majority's opinion.163 By not
adopting a heightened standard of review, agencies have too much
leeway in setting new policies without explaining their new
regulations. 64
In part two of the dissent, Justice Breyer said that the Court must
apply the standards set forth in State Farm and Overton Park for
governing what is required by the FCC in their change of fleeting
expletive policy.165 The dissent did not think the FCC satisfied the
minimum standards as required by law in justifying the new
policy.166 Justice Breyer felt that there were two critical factors the
FCC failed to address in Golden Globes that caused the order to fall
short of the requirements imposed by the law. 16 7 First, the FCC did
not address the relationship between its fleeting expletive policy and
the First Amendment requirement to avoid censorship.168 This
needed to be addressed because the FCC had explicitly decided its
159 See FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1831.
160 See id.
161 See id. at 1832.
162 See id.
163 See id.
IMSee id.
165 FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1832. Justice Breyer wrote that the
change in issue was, (1) the old policy that would normally permit broadcasters to
transmit a single, fleeting use of an expletive to (2) a new policy that would
threaten broadcasters with large fines for transmitting even a single use (including
its use by a member of the public) of such an expletive, alone with nothing more.
Id.
166 See id.
167 See id. at 1833.
168 1d.
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prior policy so it would not run afoul of the First Amendment.'69 The
majority in Pacifica explicitly said that the decision does not involve
cases of the isolated use of an offensive word; if that were the
regulation in force, it may in fact run afoul of the First
Amendment.o
Justice Breyer thought the FCC made clear that it would adhere
to the constitutional line of Justice Powell's concurrence in
Pacifica.'7 1 The FCC wrote that the First Amendment put limitations
on how far it could go regulating indecency in a 1978 opinion.172 In
1983 the FCC again repeated that it had interpreted Pacifica to
require the "repetitive occurrence of the 'indecent' words in
question." 73 As recently as 2001, the FCC said that any regulation
governing broadcasting must be based upon a compelling interest
that is accomplished by the least restrictive means. 174 All these cases
point to the fact that the FCC had repeatedly stated it had to avoid
coming too close to the constitutional line established by Justice
Powell's Pacifica concurrence. 175
The FCC said in its Golden Globes order that its decision was not
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling on First Amendment
issues in Pacifica because the Court left open the issue of whether a
fleeting expletive could be actionably indecent.176 To Justice Breyer
17 1 d. Justice Powell and Blackmun noted in Pacifica that the Court "does not
speak to cases involving the isolated use of a potentially offensive word ... as
distinguished from the verbal shock treatment administered by respondent here."
Id. (emphasis in original). In Pacifica, expletives were repeated over a hundred
times in the middle of the day when children were very likely to be listening. See
id.
171 FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1833.
172 Id. (citing In re Application of WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250,
1254).
113 See id. (quoting In re Application of Pacifica Found., 95 F.C.C.2d 750,
760). In another opinion written in 1987, the FCC again stated that the First
Amendment forced it to take a hard, careful, and restrained approach to issues
involving broadcast programming because of the relevant First Amendment free
speech issues. See Id. at 1833-34 (citing In re Infinity Broad., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705
(1987)).
174 See id.
175 See id.
176 See id.
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this was a discussion rather than explanation of the change in the
fleeting expletive policy.' 77 The FCC did not explain why it now
thought Pacifica left open the fleeting expletive issue while in the
past the FCC interpreted the constitutional line that Pacifica drew
differently. 7 8 The Justice wanted to know why the FCC abandoned
its compelling interest and less restrictive alternative test, which were
articulated in earlier FCC orders.' 79
The Justice used the opinion written by the dissenting FCC
Commissioner to reinforce his own view of what explanation is
required when changing policy. 80 The dissenting Commissioner
said that the new policy was "not the restrained enforcement policy
encouraged by the Supreme Court in Pacifica."'8 1 Justice Breyer
emphasizes that agencies do not always have to take into account
possible constitutional issues when formulating a policy, but because
of the nature of the policy at issue here, the FCC should be required
to explain relevant First Amendment issues. 182
The second main issue with the FCC's lack of explanation of its
new policy is the fact the FCC never explained the impact of its
policy on small local broadcasters.' 8 3 This issue would not have
needed to be addressed had the FCC not taken on the issue of the
potential impact on broadcasters.' 84 The FCC reasoned that the
lower costs and the ease of installing bleeping technology justified
the policy change of fining broadcasters for fleeting expletives. 85
177 FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1833-34.
178Id.
179 Id. Justice Breyer wrote that the explanation in policy did "not explain the
transformation of what the FCC had long thought an insurmountable obstacle into
an open door. The result is not simply Hamlet without the prince, but Hamlet with
a prince who, in mid-play and without explanation, just disappears." Id.
180 Id.
181 Id. (citing In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. Between
February 2, 2002 and March 8, 2008, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13334 (2006)).
182 See id. at 1835. Justice Breyer said that the "FCC works in the shadow of
the First Amendment," because the FCC is primarily concerned with regulating
broadcast speech. See id. Whenever a government is regulating or censoring
speech, there are always going to be First Amendment issues that should be
addressed no matter how minor they may be.
18' FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1835.
184 d.
185 See id.
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The FCC said nothing about small independent broadcasters who still
would not be able to afford the bleeping technology.' 86 The Justice
was concerned with any detrimental impact that the new fleeting
expletive policy could have on small broadcasters. He believed that
local broadcasters play a crucial role in increasing media coverage of
local events that would not necessarily receive airtime on a major
network; any policy that may curtail the ability of these local
broadcasters to continue their same level of coverage should be
seriously examined.'87 The broadcasters told the Court that the cost
of bleeping systems could cost hundreds of thousands of dollars for
the installation and annual operation of that technology, which is
beyond the financial ability of small broadcasters to pay.'8 8
The majority acknowledged the FCC did not adequately discuss
the impact of this regulation on small broadcasters, but they did not
think the FCC needed to address this issue to have reasoning that
complied with the law.' 89 The majority addressed three reasons why
small town broadcasters would not be exposed to increased fines.' 90
First, the majority explained "vulgar expression is less prevalent (at
least among broadcast guests) in smaller towns."'91 Justice Breyer
could not say whether vulgar expression was indeed less prevalent in
small towns, but he did note that independent stations also exist in
'" Id. Many of these small broadcasters are public service broadcasters and
the decline of their ability to afford the bleeping technology would reduce their
local coverage of many public events such as local high school sports, political
speeches, and debates. Id.
1" See id. The reasons that the technology costs over a hundred thousand
dollars annually is that "personnel costs associated with installing, maintaining, and
operating delay equipment sufficient to cover all live news, sports, and
entertainment programs could conceivably exceed the net profits of a small local
station for an entire year." Id. at 1836 (internal citation omitted).
'8 See id at 1835-36. The fear is that small broadcasters would cut back on
their coverage rather than risk exorbitant fines. Id at 1836. One small station
manager told the FCC that he had cut back on new coverage of live events where
crowds are present to reduce the risk of a fleeting expletive from a raucous crowd
member. Id. Only during civil emergencies will the manager permit coverage of
local events where there are crowds. Id.
189 FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1835-36.
190 Id. at 1837.
191 Id.
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both large and medium sized cities.192 Second, the plurality said that
there is only increased risk of fines when they broadcast local
news.193 Justice Breyer did agree that local news events did pose the
greatest risk to small broadcasters of violating the fleeting expletive
policy.194 Third, the plurality thought the FCC would exercise its
discretion and decline to impose fines on small broadcasters. 95
Justice Breyer strongly disagreed with this assertion.' 96 There is no
language in the new policy that small broadcasters will not be
fined.197 By implementing fines for any fleeting expletive, the FCC
has in fact put a new policy in place that has greatly increased small
broadcasters' risk of being fined. 198 If the FCC considered the effect
on small broadcasters, and granted them an exemption, or at least
explained why the fleeting expletive policy would apply to them,
Justice Breyer would have been more inclined to find the new policy
explanation adequate.' 99
The dissent is scared of the chilling effect the law would have on
broadcasters. 200 This chilling effect is one which the law has been
concerned about for decades, and is one that the broadcasters raised
in their arguments before the FCC; however, the chilling effect on
speech was not addressed anywhere in the FCC's Golden Globes
order.20 1 Since the FCC failed to discuss the potential chilling effect
on the free speech rights of broadcasters, and the effect of the fleeting
expletive policy on small broadcasters, the dissent would hold that
192 Id.
" See id. One could foresee a local sporting event, such as a high school
football game, where after catching a pass, a young football player shouts an
expletive in frustration close enough for the camera to pick up the audio of what he
said.
194 Id
'9' FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1837.
I96 id.
197 Id.
'
98 Id. There may be an exception for human error in using the delay
equipment. Id. However, the remand order says nothing about stations that could
not afford to purchase the bleeping equipment and whether or not this would
exempt the stations from the new fleeting expletive policy. Id.
199 See id.
2 See id.
201 See FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1837.
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the FCC's explanation regarding its change in policy is inadequate as
required by law.
Justice Breyer then raised and explained why each of the reasons
that the FCC articulated for changing its existing regulatory policy
are inadequate.202 The FCC said that expletives such as the F-Word
always conjure up excretory or sexual images; the Justice found the
problem with this explanation to be that it does not explain why it is
now viewing the F-Word differently than it had in the past.203 The
FCC was aware of the impact on listeners when it formulated its
initial policy, which is when the FCC had distinguished between the
literal use of the F-Word and non sexual uses of the F-word; Justice
Breyer wanted to know in fact why its description of the F-Word had
changed.204 The FCC said that the most important reason for the new
policy was that the new policy was more consistent with the agency's
approach to indecency as a whole. 20 5 Once again Justice Breyer
reiterated this was a statement rather than an explanation for why the
policy changed.206
The Solicitor General argued that 18 U.S.C. § 1464, on its face,
prohibited any broadcast of indecent language. 207 Justice Breyer
implicitly admitted he found these arguments persuasive, but failed to
address them when he said, "We must consider the lawfulness of an
agency's decision on the basis of the reasons the agency gave, not on
the basis of those it might have given."208 Another reason that the
FCC gave for its new policy was that the new policy better protects
children against being forced to hear an expletive. 209 Justice Breyer
was concerned that the FCC gave no empirical data suggesting that
2 02 Id. at 1838.
203 See id.
204See id.
205 d
206Id.
207 FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1838. The Solicitor General argued
that the entire purpose of the statute was to eliminate all uses of expletives on the
airwaves. Id. The Solicitor General also argued that Congress "did not intend a
safe-harbor for a fleeting use of that language." Id.
208 Id. (emphasis in original). He is suggesting that the agency had to include
that reasoning in its Golden Globes order itself rather than being raised for the first
time to the Supreme Court. See id
2
1 See id. at 1839.
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hearing an expletive just once dramatically influences and changes
the behavior of children.210 The Justice argued that in this situation
not relying on any empirical data weakened the strength of the FCC's
conclusions.211
For the past twenty-five years the broadcasters had a fleeting
expletive policy allowing an occasional expletive to be broadcast, yet
the broadcasters never aired a parade of expletives on their programs
as the FCC contended that the broadcasters would begin to do if the
fleeting expletive policy was not changed.212 The FCC gave no
reasons for why broadcasters would now choose to increase the
number of expletives on the airwaves other than it was "logic" that
the broadcasters would begin to air more indecent phrases.213 Justice
Breyer sees this reasoning as inadequate because this "logic" was
available to the FCC in 1978, when they formulated the initial policy
allowing fleeting expletives, but the FCC of yesteryear still chose to
create the fleeting expletive policy. 214
The Justice then turned to the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance.2 15 The Justice did not think, as the majority did, that the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance should be applied to this case.216
Justice Breyer would have ordered a remand to be briefed on the
relevant First Amendment issues that may be problematic with the
FCC's new regulatory policy. 2 17 Unlike the majority, Justice Breyer
would have remanded the case so that the FCC could be given the
210 See id. Justice Breyer did not think new research or data is always
necessary when an agency implements a new policy decision, but he did think that
it would be helpful in this situation. See id.
211 Id.
212 See id.
213 FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1839.
214 id.
215 Id. at 1840. Justice Breyer explained that the doctrine "seeks to avoid
unnecessary judicial consideration of constitutional questions, assumes that
Congress, no less than the Judicial Branch, seeks to act within constitutional
bounds,...thereby diminish[ing] the friction between the branches that judicial
holdings of unconstitutionality might otherwise generate." Id. The doctrines also
assumes that instead of risking a constitutional holding that would throw out the
statute, Congress would prefer a "less-than-optimal" interpretation of the statute in
question. Id.
216 id.
217 id
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opportunity to elaborate more on why it changed the fleeting
expletive policy.2 18 Justice Breyer ended his dissent by reiterating
the two biggest omissions that the FCC made while creating the new
policy. 2 19 First, the Justice wanted to know how the new policy
would affect local broadcasters. 22 0 Second, why the agency has now
chosen to reinterpret Pacifica differently than it did twenty-five years
ago. 221 In essence, the dissent's argument could be summed up as
requiring the FCC to answer one question in regard to the new
policy: "Why change?" 222
B. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
1.Impact on Administrative Agency Policy Making
The impact of this plurality decision on the administrative agency
process for changing existing policy will be significant. When an
agency changes an existing policy, regardless of how long that policy
has been in effect, the agency will no longer be required to explain
the reasons why it had switched policies. The agency will still be
required by law to explicate the reasons for the change overall, but it
will not be required to say why it did not choose to create the current
regulatory policy as its initial policy. The problem with the
majority's decision in FCC v. Fox Television is that federal agency
heads are often appointed by the President; these political appointees
can now bow more easily to political pressure to change
administrative regulatory policies to ones that suit the current party in
office.223 Courts have already begun to use FCC v. Fox Television
for the proposition that, "court[s] should uphold decisions of 'less
218 See id.
219 FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1840.
220 See id at 1841.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and
Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 10 (2009). "Justice Scalia's opinion, which
rejects the notion that agency change must be subjected to more searching judicial
review, arguably makes it easier for agencies to change their policies due to
changes in the political wind." Id.
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than ideal clarity' so long as 'agency's path may be reasonably
discerned."' 2 24
2.Impact on Broadcasters
The new indecency policy may have a chilling effect on the free
speech rights of broadcasters. Prior to Golden Globes, and after
Chairman Powell's appointment to the FCC in 2001, broadcasters
would self-censor in response to the increased number of instances
where fines were being imposed on broadcasters. 2 25 The Supreme
Court did not take up the First Amendment issue of whether the new
policy of fining broadcasters for a single fleeting expletive violates
their free speech rights. This issue is likely to come up before the
Court in the near future as the Court declined to address the First
Amendment issue, which Justice Ginsburg, Breyer, and Thomas all
wanted to address.
Local sporting events pose a problem for small broadcasters in
particular because, unlike recorded programs, which are heavily
edited, sporting events are live, unrehearsed, and, most importantly,
unpredictable.226 The big risk in sporting events comes from fans
chanting expletives or athletes cursing, both of which can be often
picked up by microphones.227 Prior to Golden Globes there were
various instances of expletives being picked up by microphones at
224 See Water Quality Ins. Syndicate v. United States, 632 F. Supp. 2d 108, 114
(D. Mass. 2009).
225 Sparr, supra note 14, at 245. The fines for indecency violations increased
from $48,000 in 2000 to $91,000 in 2001 and $440,000 in 2003. Id. at 246. In
2004 the FCC levied more fines on broadcasters for indecency violations than in
"the previous ten years combined." Id. Out of fear of being fined, various
broadcasters began editing out content. Id. at 247. For example, NBC removed a
scene from ER showing the breast of an eighty-year-old woman receiving medical
care, and PBS cut out seconds of a love scene from a documentary on Emma
Goldman because there was too much cleavage in the scene. Id. One legal scholar
wrote, "[i]ndecency enforcement generally abated during the Clinton era FCC, but
came back with a vengeance in the George W. Bush years." Conrad, supra note 4,
at 183.226 Id. at 188.
227 Id
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sporting events.228 However, under pre-Golden Globes
jurisprudence, the FCC declined to fine these broadcasters.22 9 Under
FCC v. Fox, all of these indecent broadcasts would have been
actionable. It is foreseeable that under the current regulatory regime
the FCC could impose fines upon a broadcaster for not bleeping an
obscenity. I am not as convinced as Justice Breyer that the FCC
would actually impose fines on small independent broadcasters if an
expletive made its way onto a live broadcast. However, the FCC
should tackle this issue head-on and carve out an exception for
sporting events, or at least articulate what its current policy regarding
live sporting events is. Otherwise, there may be a chilling effect on
small local broadcasters, who may now refuse to broadcast local high
school and college sporting events out of fear of being fined by the
FCC.
3. Oral Arguments in Remand to the Second Circuit
FCC v. Fox was reargued during remand before the Second
Circuit on January 13, 2010. The Supreme Court had ruled that the
FCC's explanation for changing its regulatory policy was adequate,
but broadcasters now argued that the fleeting expletive policy
violated their First Amendment rights. 23 0 The counsel for the
broadcasters argued that the Second Circuit should use either
intermediate or strict scrutiny in determining whether the policy of
fining for single indecent phrases on broadcast television violated the
First Amendment. 231 The broadcasters believed that the policy would
fail both intermediate and strict scrutiny analysis. The broadcasters
saw Pacifica as the outer limit of what was permitted in regulating
228 Id. at 189. A microphone picked up a player yelling "motherfucker" during
a baseball playoff game in 2001. In that same year, an NFL player used the same
expletive during the introduction ceremony of the Super bowl broadcast on national
television. Id. One more example to illustrate the unpredictability of sporting
events was highlighted when John McEnroe yelled "shut the flick up" into the
headset of an NBC cameraman. Id.
229 Id.
230 See C-SPAN, Fox Television v. FCC, C-SPAN VIDEO LIBRARY (January 13,
2010), http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/291305-1.
231 See id.
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free speech.232 The intervener for NBC had issue with the fact that
the FCC was the one to define what current contemporary
community standards were.233 Since Golden Globes, the FCC
decides if a program is newsworthy or artistic.234 If the FCC decides
that a certain subject is neither artistic nor newsworthy they could
subject the broadcasters to fines, creating a very subjective
process. 235 The counsel for the broadcasters pointed to a number of
cases in which broadcasters that had previously shown programs on
the air under the pre-Golden Globes regulatory scheme now refused
to carry those programs for fear of being fined. For example, many
broadcast affiliates refused to carry Saving Private Ryan after 2004
even though many had carried it in 2001.236 Lack of predictability
has made it impossible to determine both what a violation is and what
the consequences would be for a violation.237 The broadcasters were
also incredibly concerned about the chilling effect of free speech on
live news programs and sporting events.
IV. CONCLUSION
FCC v. Fox has settled the question of how detailed an agency's
rational explanation for a change in regulatory policy must be when
the new policy departs from the old. There is no higher standard
imposed on an agency when that agency explicates the new policy.
The agency only needs to go into the reasoning that it would have
had if it had created the policy initially. This means that an agency
does not necessarily need to answer the question of why the policy
was being changed, as the dissent in FCC v. Fox argued that it had to
do. The holding of FCC v. Fox was summed up succinctly by Justice
Scalia when he wrote in the opinion that, "our opinion. . . neither
held nor implied that every agency action representing a policy
change must be justified by reasons more substantial than those
232 See id.
233 See id.
234 See id.
235 See id.
236 See C-SPAN, Fox Television v. FCC, C-SPAN VIDEO LIBRARY (January 13,
2010), http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/291305-1.
237 See id.
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required to adopt the policy in the first instance."238 This decision
leaves more room for agency heads to order administrative policy
changed for purely political reasons, since they do not necessarily
need to account for why the new policy is better than the old.
While FCC v. Fox answered one question, it raised another. The
Supreme Court said that the FCC's rationale explaining the new
policy was adequate and met the standard imposed by law, but the
Supreme Court explicitly declined to address the issue of whether the
new fleeting expletive policy was constitutional.239 On remand to the
Second Circuit the broadcasters focused their argument on
challenging the constitutionality of the decision on First Amendment
grounds. However the Second Circuit decides, the case will probably
make its way back up to the Supreme Court, as many of the justices
appeared open to consideration of the First Amendment issue and
reexamination of Pacifica.240 Writing in his concurrence, Justice
Thomas wrote regarding Pacifica, "[t]his deep intrusion into the First
Amendment rights of broadcasters, which the Court has justified ...
is problematic." 24 1 Justice Ginsburg also seemed to be very
concerned about First Amendment issues, and invited a challenge on
those grounds when she wrote, "[t]here is no way to hide the long
shadow the First Amendment casts over what the Commission has
done. Today's decision does nothing to diminish that shadow." 242
The FCC's fleeting expletive policy must be reexamined in light of
the First Amendment or broadcasters may decide to air fewer live
sporting events and news casts out of fear of being fined by the
Commission. In considering the relevant First Amendment issues of
the FCC's policy, the Court must remember that "words unpalatable
to some may be 'commonplace' for others."243
238 FCC v. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1810.
239 Id. The majority wrote, "[t]he Second Circuit did not definitively rule on
the constitutionality of the Commission's orders, but respondents nonetheless ask
us to decide their validity under the First Amendment ... We decline to address the
constitutional question at this time." Id.
2401 d. at 1821.
241 Id. at 1820. Justice Thomas went on to argue that Pacifica "lack[ed] any
textual basis in the Constitution." Id. at 1821.242 Id. at 1828.
243 Id at 1829.
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